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2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: Yes
Text: it might be thought, and indeed firstsouth argues, that this contention is foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties that the loan was secured by a first lien on residential real property. on the other hand, the stipulation could, we suppose, be read simply as an agreement that the property was residential in fact, that is, that structures in which people lived, or were to live, had been built on it, thus leaving open the question of law whether the property was residential as that term is used in section 501(a)(1)(a). as a rule, stipulations are not considered binding as to issues of law, and it is conceivable that even a word like residential, which has a well-understood meaning in the world, as opposed to in court, might have been used by congress as a term of art.
Label: No
Text: initially, and as a question of first impression in this circuit, we must interpret the meaning of a portion of 552a(e)(7). section 552a(e)(7) prohibits federal agencies from maintaining records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 u.s.c. 552a(e)(7) (emphasis added). the precise meaning of the emphasized portion is not defined by the statute itself. the district court compared the decisions of other circuits which have interpreted this particular section and adopted a rule requiring agencies to demonstrate that any and all records maintained on an individuals exercise of first amendment rights are relevant to an authorized law enforcement activity of the agency, and that there exists a sufficient basis for the maintenance of such records. 705 f.supp. at 1043 (emphasis in original). it is this definition that the parties now dispute. todd argues that agencies should be made to show a substantial relationship between the records and the government activity. he insists that a relevancy standard acts to dilute his first amendment rights.
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using a dictionary definition for terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using a dictionary, or discuss the logic behind using a dictionary. Otherwise label "No".
Text: however, lederman does not cite, nor have we found, any minnesota decision that applies 541.051, subd. 1(c) to actions against an owner for injuries incurred during construction. indeed, the statutory language cautions against such a reading. section 541.051, subd. l(c)s reference to actions alleging negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real property suggests an improvement that already has been completed, but that must be kept in a state of repair. for instance, blacks law dictionary defines maintenance as [t]he upkeep or preservation of condition of property, including cost of ordinary repairs necessary and proper from time to time for that purpose. blacks law dictionary 953 (6th ed.1990); see also gorton v. mashburn, 995 p.2d 1114, 1116 (okla.1999) (maintenance is best characterized as after-care or upkeep.); websters third new international dictionary 1170, 1581 (1960) (defining inspection as an examination ... of an installation and operation as the quality or state of being functional or operative). in this case, constructing the shoreline suites constituted more than mere repair, the improvement as it existed at the time of ledermans injury could not be called an installation, and the suites were not functional or operative.
Label: | textualism_tool_dictionaries |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
0 | Yes | {'index': '0', 'text': 'the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
3 | No | {'index': '3', 'text': 'the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
2 | No | {'index': '2', 'text': 'a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
1 | Yes | {'index': '1', 'text': 'on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.'} | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: the texas code does not define election laws, and we have found no case construing this phrase. thus, we first look to the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of election laws. see perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37, 42, 100 s.ct. 311, 314, 62 l.ed.2d 199 (1979) (noting that it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction ... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning). we think that the common meaning of election laws is laws that specifically govern elections, rather than generally applicable laws that may affect elections. if the texas legislature wanted 31.003 to cover the latter, we doubt that it would have inserted the adjectival modifier election directly before the noun law. by forming an open compound phrase such as election law, the texas legislature meant a combination of separate words that are so closely related as to constitute a single concept. chicago manual of style 6.33 (14th rev. ed. 1993). an election district, for instance, is not a district devised for many functions, including elections; it is a district created for the purposes of elections. 5 oxford english dictionary 116 (2d ed. 1989). moreover, an election board is not an agency that carries out all the responsibilities of a municipality, including elections; it is an agency charged with the conduct of elections. blacks law dictionary 519 (6th ed.1990).
Label: Yes
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: Yes
Text: a major difficulty undercutting the majoritys position is that, unlike the indian gaming regulatory act (igra) at issue in seminole tribe, the telecommunications act does not impose an elaborate remedial scheme upon a reviewing court; in fact, the statute fails to specify any particular relief. bell atlantic-pa., 107 f.supp.2d at 664 (citations omitted). as the delaware district court explained:
Label: No
Text: the government argues that mr. blacks interpretation of the speedy trial act would discourage governmental consent to transfers under rule 20, which would lead to more consecutive sentences, mr. black could still challenge the delay based on the constitution rather than the speedy trial act, and dismissal of the indictment would impede the efficient use of resources
Label: No
Text: {{text}}
Label: | Label "Yes" if the paragraph interprets a statue using the plain or ordinary meaning of the terms in the statute. The paragraph must reference that it is using plain meaning, or discuss the logic behind using plain meaning. Otherwise label "No".
Text: on the other hand, however, the plain language of rule 6(e)(2) does not support that part of jeters contention that this rule somehow forbids punishment of unjustified grand jury disclosures under any other statutory rule. rule 6(e)(2) states: no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. the surrounding language clearly supports the view that this limitation refers only to action against the aforementioned class of individuals who owe a formal and on-going obligation of secrecy due to their connection with the grand jury [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(a)(ii) of this subdivision [i.e., other necessary governmental personnel] [emphasis added]. it is simply illogical to attempt to construe rule 6(e)(2) as mandating that all other classes of individuals can act to destroy the secrecy of grand jury proceedings without criminal sanction.
Label: | textualism_tool_plain |
Subsets and Splits