We, Borg
========

Speculations on Hive Minds as a Posthuman State
-----------------------------------------------

*by Anders Sandberg*

>
> The designers of our species set out to produce a being that might be capable of an
>  order of mentality higher than their own. The only possibility of doing so lay in planning
>  a great increase in brain organisation. But they knew that the brain of an individual
>  human being could not safely be allowed to exceed a certain weight. They therefore sought
>  to produce the new order of mentality in a system of distinct and specialised brains held
>  in "telepathic" unity by means of ethereal radiation. Material brains were to be
>  capable of becoming on some occasions mere nodes in a system of radiation which itself
>  should then constitute the physical basis of a single mind.
>
> Olaf Stapledon, Last and First Men
>
>
>

Hive minds where the individual is subsumed into a collective consciousness has been a
recurring idea in science fiction since Olaf Stapledon's influential novels *Last and
First Men* (1931) and *Star Maker* (1937), although the concept in some sense had
been suggested by *Leviathan* of Thomas Hobbes (1651). They have often in western
science fiction been used as an allegory for communism or the anonymity of industrial
civilisation, and have usually been portrayed in a terrifying light (Nicholls 1982). The
latest such portrayal is the Borg in *Star Trek: the Next Generation*: a race of
bionically augmented humanoids linked together into a collective mind, striving to
assimilate every other intelligent species into the Collective.

Due to the popularity of the show several new words for hive minds have been coined
(Morrow 1996):

**Borganism:**
1) An organization of formerly autonomous beings who have merged their individual wills
 to create one, collectively conscious being; 2) The social and political theory that
 advocates the creation of borganisms.
**Borganise:**
To form a borganism, to organise its structure.

I will in the following call the beings making up the borganism **units** (calling
them individuals would be erroneous since they by definition lack individuality, and the
borganism is clearly divisible, hence it cannot be called an individual either). The word
borganism is especially suitable since I will look at hive minds from a cybernetic point
of view (cybernetics -> cyborg -> borg).

This essay seeks to look into the psychology and sociology of borganisms, and to
discuss borganisms as a possible posthuman state.

Borganisms in Nature
--------------------

Borganisms might at first appear to be fanciful ideas, more grounded in science fiction
and human desires/fears than in practical reality. But in nature there already exists
several systems that suggests otherwise. The most common example used is the hives of
social insects, where all individuals work for the common good with little regard for
themselves. Although it has been argued that hives lack collective minds (Nicholls 1982)
it should be noted that all such species communicate with chemical signals, and at least
in the case of ants chemical trails can be seen as collective cognitive maps distributed
in the environment (Chiavlo & Millonas 1995). There may exist degrees of
borganisation, and they are tied to how closely the units communicate.

Another natural system of interest is the structure of multicellular organisms. The
transition from single-celled life to multicellular life can be seen as borganisation. The
chemical "minds" of cells are closely connected, and in some cases cells have
gap-junctions connecting their cytoplasm or even merge to form a cyncyticum. In a
multicellular organism the cells are differentiated into different tissues with different
functions, which sometimes include the planned death of cells (such as in the case of the
formation of the protective outer layer of skin, the stratum corneum). Differentiation is
mediated through chemical signals from other cells which affect the genetic expression of
proteins and continued cell behaviour. This examples shows that a borganism can have a
complex internal structure. All units do not need to be equal, and specialisation and
hierarchical control is a possibility.

The third example of a borganism-like system in nature is the human brain. It consists
of several parts able to act independently but closely tied together, so closely that
normally these divisions go unnoticed. In some cases the system is disturbed and the
potential independence of the parts can become apparent. One example is split brain
patients whose hemispheres have been disconnected; most of the time this does not cause
any noticeable change, but under some circumstances the two sides come into conflict or
interfere with each other. Another example is the dissociative states that can occur
during hypnosis or traumatic situations where the mind is divided into two or more parts
having different access to sensory information and motor control (Hilgard 1977, Putnam
1989). The brain shows that the borganism might not even need to be aware of the units
making it up, it can exist on a higher level, perhaps as a metasystem (Turchin &
Joslyn 1993).

Communication and Structure in Borganisms
-----------------------------------------

>
> Many other triumphs of eugenical experiment we observed up and down the worlds. The
>  general level of individual intelligence was, of course, raised far beyond the range of
>  Homo Sapiens. But also that superintelligence which can be attained only by a psychically
>  unified community was greatly developed on the highest practicable plane, that of the
>  conscious individuality of a whole world. This, of course, was impossible until the social
>  cohesion of individuals within the world-community has become as closeknit as the
>  integration of the elements of a nervous system.
>
> Olaf Stapledon, Star Maker
>
>
>

Communication is central to borganisation. By definition the units making up a
borganism will be in close mental contact; the bandwidth and structure of this contact
will determine much of the properties of the borganism.

It may be hard to tell when a group of individuals becomes a borganism; the psychology
of a group can be significantly different from the psychology of the individuals, and even
among humans individuality can be subsumed by group identity under some conditions.
However, so far intra-group communication has been mainly verbal, kinetic and possibly
chemical (pheromones). As the bandwidth increases new phenomena will likely appear and the
group as an organism begins to take on its own life.

The communication between the units of a borganism can be characterised by its
bandwidth and topology.

### Bandwidth

Bandwidth denotes the amount of information exchanged between units and to which mental
depth it occurs; speech is a low bandwidth communication only reaching a superficial
mental level while a direct mental link giving insight in the mental imagery of the other
part would be a high bandwidth communication. The extreme case is total connection where
the bandwidth is so high that all units form a single neural network. What is uncertain at
present is how high bandwidth is needed to create a true borganism. This may be a matter
of degree rather than a distinct transition between several individuals and one borganism.

Starting from a low bandwidth we have a group of individuals communicating and acting
on mutual goals. As the bandwidth is increased they can not only communicate intentions
but their deeper causes; at higher bandwidths the mental chains leading to decisions
become communicable and hence shareable. This may allow collaborative refinement of goals
and plans in a much more efficient way than low-bandwidth discussion and the borders
between individuals gradually fade away. Note that the units still can be specialised and
have different memories, values and personalities.

Group psychology has studied under what conditions groups become more (or less)
productive than individuals. In general it depends on the nature of the task and group. In
problem solving tasks groups frequently develops better solutions than individuals
(Hellriegel et al 1989), since there are more opportunities for error- correction, idea
generation, scenario testing and a higher likelihood that the skills and knowledge needed
to solve a complex problem are available. This is especially true for tasks which can be
subdivided easily.

Groups do not perform better than their most gifted individual on tasks which cannot be
subdivided if the task is simple and the solution immediately becomes obvious to everyone
once it is proposed (Baron & Byrne 1991). In many cases of human psychology social
processes can interfere with this and decrease the performance; this might be possible to
circumvent in a borganism. For example, in human groups the gifted individual often
voluntarily stands back in order not to dominate the discussions; in a borganism there is
less concern for the individual (both positive and negative), which suggests that this
tendency will be weakened in favour of helping the group. The above observations of human
problem solving suggests that borganisms should divide problems into manageable chunks
which are handled by small subnetworks (possibly temporary) which in turn communicate with
each other, at least in the case of divisible problems. In less easily divided problems it
appears likely that a high bandwidth connection between the participating units is
desirable, turning them into a more homogenous group.

So far I have assumed the group is interacting in a fairly homogenous manner, akin to a
meeting. It is also possible to differentiate between a planning part of the borganism and
an executive part which implements the plans while remaining in contact with the planning
part. This suggests two densely connected clusters of units linked by a somewhat lower
bandwidth link.

It appears likely that for a borganism which encounters different kinds of problems in
daily life it is advantageous to modify its internal topology and bandwidth. There are of
course technological and physical limitations to this, as well as a control problem: what
subsystem should organise the topology?

One possibility was suggested in *Star Trek: First Contact*: the "Borg
Queen", a female unit explained her function as "I bring order into chaos".
This could be interpreted as her having an organising role unlike the other fairly
identical units; other replies suggested that she was instantiated on other, perhaps all,
borg ships. A borganism may consist of two different kinds of units, one basic general
purpose unit that makes up most of the population, implementing the collective will, and
one or a few organising units optimising the internal structure (possibly acting as
arbitrators in internal conflicts or a supervisory B-brain (see Minsky 1988).

However, it is not certain there is a need for special units. If individual units can
influence their topology and bandwidth, it is not unreasonable to think that a regulatory
system could be implemented locally, for example by a market-based approach (Miller &
Drexler 1988). It is important to realise that borganisms may consist of many different
kinds of units both physically and mentally; while most descriptions have concentrated on
homogenous or stratified structures borganisms with wildly diverse units, possibly as
different as humans, AI systems and non-intelligent software agents, are a possibility.

### Topology

The topology can be varied endlessly. A simple solution is total interconnectivity
where every unit is connected to every other. Total interconnectivity is usually
inefficient since the total bandwidth (and its overhead) grows as N^2 (where N is the
number of units); in most cases there is little need for every unit to constantly
communicate with every other and most of the bandwidth is wasted. If time or attention has
to be taken from work to keep up to date with what other units are doing there will even
be an optimum size of the borganism where the total amount of work done is maximal, above
it the overhead of communication removes any advantage in adding more units.

Other interesting topologies are bus structures where units needing to communicate do
so through a high bandwidth medium (for example broadcast signals or infrared links to a
computer network), hierarchical topologies where supervisory or logistic units acts as
intermediaries for the communication (this places high demands on their ability to manage
high bandwidths; the top level can easily become a bottleneck) and hypercube topologies
where the units form a multidimensional cube and each unit communicates with log2(N)
others; the maximal distance between any two units is log2(N) and the total bandwidth
grows as Nlog2(N).

As can be seen, knowledge from designing multiprocessor systems can be applied to
borganisms. In both cases the problem is distributing information in a system consisting
of many subunits, and finding problems and ways of solving them that work well in
parallel.

To accommodate a changeable topology the network must be as flexible as possible. Most
likely a virtual network is the simplest solution: the mental topology is implemented as a
layer on top of another network, for example a fast packet-switched network where each
unit is linked to the nearest node, or an internet of different networks.

One interesting architecture of a borganism is a hierarchy of meta- individuals.
Individuals form meta-individuals due to high bandwidth connections and well coordinated
mental processes. These meta-individuals form higher level individuals, and so on until a
top level is reached. This suggests a hierarchical network topology where higher levels
mainly exchange high-level information keeping the necessary bandwidth low by a high level
of abstraction. A similar structure has been suggested by Marvin Minsky for the human
mind, where "agents" (simple independent subsystems with their own goals)
interact to form more complex behaviours which can be grouped into higher level agents
(Minsky 1988).

This scenario is similar to the hierarchy of minds in Stapledon's *Star Maker*:
advanced cultures form planetary borganisms where each individual is at the same time a
part of the planetary mind and an independent individual. The planetary minds in turn form
galactic minds in the same way, which in turn participates in the universal ultimate mind.

It is worth noting this model doesn't imply that each unit lacks individuality;
Stapledon quite clearly suggests that they can remain individuals but at the same time
participate in the borganism. One possibility is the ability to link into the borganism at
will, another is a permanent linkup which leaves some mental levels individual while
others collective.

The Psychology of Borganisms
----------------------------

>
> So perfectly organised was the life of the minded swarm that all routine activities of
>  industry and agriculture had become, from the point of view of the swarm's mind,
>  unconscious, like the digestive processes of a human being. The little insectoid units
>  themselves carried on these consciously, though without understanding their significance;
>  but the mind of the swarm had lost the power of attending to them. Its concern was almost
>  wholly with such activities as called for unified conscious control, in fact with
>  practical and theoretical invention of all kinds and with physical and mental exploration.
>
>
> Olaf Stapledon, Star Maker
>
>
>

How does a borganism recruit units? There are three possible answers: the individual
must willingly give up some of its individuality in exchange for the positive effects of
being part of the borganism (extended mental capacity, transhuman support etc), the
individual is involuntarily borganised, or the individual is created as a part of the
borganism.

Being a part of a borganism may or may not be reversible depending of how much the
individual unit is integrated into the collective mind. If units are individuals which are
linked together into a relatively low-bandwidth mental network for enhanced communication
and metasystem formation the process may be reversible (although the former units may have
a hard time understanding or remembering their thoughts as borganism). More intimate forms
of communication may however necessitate a permanent link to the borganism since the unit
is dependent on other units for many mental processes. Since it is likely a borganism will
need a significant amount of mental coordination to function well having units leave or
join often may be disadvantageous.

Unwilling units may not be desirable, both for the above reasons and due to the risk of
memetic infections (see the section about borganic weaknesses). If units remain relatively
unchanged when they are integrated into the collective, unwilling units are likely to be
highly disturbing and more trouble than the extra mental capacity is worth. However, if
the borganism doesn't care for the individual skills and memes of the units they can
perhaps be "mentally reformatted", turned into standardised drones a la the Borg
of Star Trek.

A recruitment method which circumvents the problems of both the other methods is to
build/grow new units to fit the borganism. This could range from having units grow up
linked to the borganism (which would likely make their minds much better adapted to a
borganic existence) to the copying of units. If units grow up in the borganism it is very
likely they will adapt well to it, likely to a much larger extent than units introduced
from the outside.

With advanced cloning techniques and a way to imprint suitable neural information it
does not appear entirely unlikely that individuals could create more or less similar
clones of themselves. Since these copies would be very similar, it is likely they will fit
into the borganism well if the original does. It is even easier if uploading is possible:
the borganism consists of infomorph entities which are interlinked much more strongly than
would be possible if the units were entirely physical; the physical presence of the
borganism could be handled by telepresence. Copying might enable a single individual to
develop into a borganism, where all units (at least originally) share his or her values,
goals and personality, making a good foundation to build a metaorganism on (assuming the
basic personality is compatible with borganisation; some people might not get along with
themselves).

### Emotion

One obvious trait of the Borgs of *Star Trek* is their total emotionlessness; even
in extreme situations they behave robotically. Most likely this was intended to dehumanise
them further, but there is a good reason to expect that borganisms may tend to *appear*
emotionless. In humans mood is conveyed through intonations, body language and especially
facial expression. This transmission is important since without functional emotional
communication many humans have a hard time functioning socially. But in a borganism
emotions need not be expressed through body language and expression, since they can be
expressed much more clearly through the intranet communication. There is no point for an
unit to smile if it is amused (or the borganism as a whole is amused) since any other unit
would be able to know exactly what mood it is in. So it is likely borganisms (unless they
try to avoid it) would appear emotionless to individual humans despite having a rich inner
life.

### Self-Sacrifice

It sometimes occurs that parents sacrifice themselves for their children, or siblings
for each other. There are sound sociobiological reasons for this which serve to ensure
genetic survival, and throughout history individuals have sacrificed themselves to ensure
the survival of their memes in an analogous fashion (Dawkins 1976). A borganism is a
memetic organism, and it might be possible for units to sacrifice themselves for the
borganism. This regularly occurs in *Star Trek* and real insect colonies. If all
units are roughly identical there is no great loss (except in resources) to sacrifice one
from the perspective of the borganism *and* the unit, which ensures the survival of
similar units and its shared memes. If the connections between units are powerful enough
or the units are infomorphs it may even be possible to make mental backups, making self-
sacrifice relatively cheap. More individual units of course have more to lose, and it is
less likely the borganism can compel them to sacrifice themselves (still, this is largely
dependent on the memes dominant in the borganism and units).

### Interaction

How would a borganism interact with other borganisms and individuals? It is important
to realise that as a metaorganism borganisms may not even perceive individuals as anything
than independent units, with roughly the same value (which may be high or low). To a
borganism the other "real" inhabitants of the world may be other borganisms, the
independent units are simply not "real" beings. This seems to be the classic
view of how borganisms would see the world, and fits in quite well with the villain
stereotype. However, there is no particular reason for why borganisms would be unable to
appreciate the individual existence of non-borganisms.

Being communication-based entities, borganisms may have an easier time communicating
with each other than individuals have. If one ignores technical problems of compatibility
and protocol, it seems quite possible for borganisms to interlink in order to communicate.
This would correspond to an extremely high bandwidth channel, enabling fast transmission
of very complex concepts. There is of course the matter of avoiding total merge and
security, but this could perhaps be dealt with by using some units as a
"firewall".

Implementation of Borganisation
-------------------------------

>
> I want to be assimilated. I want to be borg. Machines will not destroy humans; humans
>  and machine will become one. Crist Clark
>
>
>

Many descriptions of borganisms have assumed telepathy, but as Olaf Stapledon pointed
out in 1937 radio could do just as well. Implementing a high-bandwidth mobile information
network is a hot research topic today, linked to research into wearable computing, mobile
offices and ubiquitious computing.

How large bandwidth is needed? We can estimate a lower bound from the bandwidth of
speech and body language, which appears to be on the order of 10-100 bits/s. A highest
upper bound would be total interconnection at the same signal density as the human mind,
or roughly 10^18 bits/s, quite an extreme range. However, the two human hemispheres
communicate closely through the corpus callosum normally with no discernible differences;
this connection has a theoretical bandwidth on the order of 10^10 bits/s, which could be
seen as a likely bandwidth needed for a deep connection between different units making
them truly parts of the same mind.

It seems likely that for any high bandwidth borganism neural interfaces are necessary,
since there are no channels into the mind with enough extra bandwidth. Hence an artificial
borganism interface is needed. Of course, it may turn out that smaller bandwidths does
accommodate the formation of borganisms (as mentioned above, the *conscious*
bandwidth appears to be quite small, on the order of 100 bits/s according to some
researchers).

Of course, a simple solution would be to keep the minds of the units in a computational
matrix outside the bodies, which are controlled remotely. This would require a bandwidth
similar to the spinal cord + brain nerves, on the order of 10^10 bits/s per body or so. It
may even be possible to let the bodies largely run themselves using lower level systems of
the brain and spinal cord. Since a significant amount of information is simply abstracted
away before reaching the conscious level and higher brain functions the necessary
bandwidth would be even smaller, and hence easier to send.

Designing a mobile linkup to the borganism network is nontrivial due to the estimated
demands. Current mobile networks (radio, IR) reach around 100 Kbit/s-10 Mbit/s over short
ranges <50 meters (Weiser 1991, 1996) which suggests that we need three orders of
magnitude broader bandwidth to achieve the necessary 10^10 bits/s for high bandwidth
borganisation. This does not appear impossible in principle: visible light lasers could
enable this bandwidth over line-of-sight distances, and neural activity is normally quite
sparse and likely possible to compress (roughly 5% of a set of neurons are active at any
given time; this suggests that the signals can be compressed by one to two orders of
magnitude). Other aspects of the borganism network structure are addressed by current work
in ubiquitious and mobile computing, such as flexible switching between transceivers,
error correction, energy demands and network protocols. In principle a high bandwidth
neural interface seems to be doable using near future technology.

A likely structure would consist of a high-bandwidth non-mobile digital network
("the backbone") which acts as the central switching system for the present
units. They can either be in contact with it, enabling very high bandwidth communication,
or mobile, in which case they communicate with it using radio, IR or visible laser signals
(it is amusing to note that the Borg in *Star Trek* often have lasers playing over
their surroundings). The signals have a short range, and need only reach the nearest
transceiver. Units outside the "hive" will not be able to communicate with the
borganism with as high bandwidth, and may have to settle for radio signals. It seems
likely that units "on their own" must deal with situations that occur more as
individuals than as parts of the borganism.

Inside the borganism network, signals are dynamically routed between units (and other
augmentative hard- and software). Low-level protocols implement packet-switching and
virtual connections, whose structure and organization is regulated by an "arbitration
layer" which could be seen as the pre-conscious part of the borganism's mind. This
arbitration layer could be implemented (as discussed above) using coordinator units,
market based systems, other approaches or mixed systems; the arbitration layer makes sure
the virtual network structure is optimal for the tasks at hand, and organizes the units
into meaningful teams and groups. These teams and groups form the true mind of the
borganism, which gathers information, solves problems and implements solutions.

Weaknesses of Borganisms
------------------------

Despite their likely high mental and practical capacity borganisms have noticeable
weaknesses, just as individual organisms do.

Many of the problems of borganisms are emergent properties of the system, not inherent
in the units themselves.

### Memetic Infection

One of the most worrying weaknesses is the spread of virulent information patterns such
as memes. Memes thrive in environments with intense communication (Bjarneskans et al.
1997), and would likely spread extremely quickly inside a borganism, infecting both
collective and unit schemata. Having a working system for memetic defence appears to be
vital for the well-being of a borganism, especially in the face of memes similar to
computer viruses (in the cybernetic environment of a borganism there is little
difference). It is not unlikely that a borganism has to retain a high degree of mental
hygiene in order not to succumb to selfish mental replicators.

Still, it is unlikely that external or internal memetic defences will be perfect,
especially since the borganism itself may accidentally create destabilizing memes during
normal thinking and internal communication. The evolution of parasites appears to be
ubiquitous in life-like (eco)systems, and the more interconnected the ecosystem is, the
greater is the complexity of coevolution and hyperparasitism (Kelly 1994). This suggests
that borganisms might generally not be able to avoid a certain level of internal selfish
replicators, and that the best strategy in dealing with them is to integrate symbiotic
replicators as a kind of immune system rather than attempt to fruitlessly eradicate them
(Moravec 1988).

### Groupthink

Groupthink is a common problem in human groups: the group becomes divorced from reality
due to its internal consensus (which may even be illusory); it fails to question its own
assumptions and to take unwelcome aspects of reality into account. If the borganism has to
keep its units in line, it is likely it will directly or indirectly counteract dissent,
which may promote groupthink. Often the best way of avoiding groupthink is to allow
dissenting minorities to present their view. On the other hand, borganisms with
sufficiently high bandwidth may be *less* susceptible to groupthink than human
groups. If the units can present not only their views but the mental processes which
reached these views it may become easier to judge the relative merit of the different
positions. They are no longer assertions about reality but rather different models which
can be analysed using critical thinking, empirical testing or synthesis.

### The Selfish Borg

A borganism is not just a distributed organism, it is also in some sense a social
organisation. This means that the relationship between itself and its units can become a
source of trouble. If memetic evolution and spread cannot be avoided (for example by
having units whose minds can easily be reformatted), there is the risk that discontent or
other disturbances can propagate among the units, destabilising the borganism.

For example, selfish units may be a problem. Assuming that the units retain some
autonomy, it is not unreasonable to think that some might decide to profit on the expense
of the borganism. In human groups this can be observed as the diffusion of responsibility
(the more people involved in a task the less intensely they tend to work if their results
cannot be traced back to them) and forms of social parasitism. If this strategy is
successful it can quickly spread (due to the fast transmission of memes) leading to the
weakening or dissolution of the borganism. Accountability of units may be a simple way of
dealing with this, especially since the borganism network is likely ideal for keeping
track of what everybody is doing (or not doing). Still, it is likely that selfish
strategies can develop which are hard to detect.

Discussion
----------

>
> We are the Borg. Lower your shields, and surrender your ship. We will add your
>  biological and technological distinctiveness to our own. Your culture will adapt to
>  service ours. Resistance is futile.
>
> Star Trek
>
>
>

Borganisms horrify some and attract others. They represent both the human fear of
losing the self and the vision of total community. The Borg of *Star Trek* are
depicted as inhuman and ruthless, while the "minded planets" of Stapledon are
benevolent and spiritual. Hobbes suggests that a limited form of borganisation (the
formation of societies with strong rulers) is necessary for individual survival and
well-being.

Regardless of people's reactions to them, borganisms are one of the best explored forms
of posthumanity. Unlike Jupiter brains or uploaded entities, we can at least have an
inkling of what they are and how they can be brought about; there is no immense
discontinuity between current humanity and borganisms.

Are borganisation a desirable state? The answer seems to depend on how much one values
individuality and autonomy. If these are made central values borganisms are clearly not
desirable, and to an extreme individualist it might even appear ethical to disrupt
borganisms in order to "free" the units (Morrow 1996). The case is not as clear
for voluntary borganisms where units both retain a sense of individuality and still belong
to the borganism. In this case extreme individualists would likely argue that being part
of a borganisation stunts personal development and freedom, even if it is voluntary (this
also mirrors the libertarian debates about the rights of government versus the individual,
and the legitimacy of the "social contract").

If one does not see individuality and autonomy as fundamental values there are fewer
arguments against borganisms. There is a certain worry that borganisms will be inefficient
social or memetic attractors; suboptimal evolutionary stable strategies (one possible
attractor state in the Strong Convergence Hypothesis of Boström 1997), or that the goals
of the borganism as a whole will in the long run become incompatible with the original
goals of the units which joined together. There is some evidence for the later
possibility: the goals of multicellular organisms and hives of insects call for the
sacrifice of their units, and judging from the relative amount of biomass in
multicellular/single celled and social/nonsocial insects the non-borganised lifeforms do
quite well *from the perspective of the individual*, although borganisation clearly
is not a disadvantage for the genes and may instead be very advantageous on the genetic
level (Dawkins 1976). If this observation can be translated into the noosphere, it
suggests that borganisms are advantageous for many strongly action-influencing memes and
meme-complexes (a possible example would be religions or ideologies) which can override
the personal self-interest of individuals. It is worth noting that in the biosphere the
borganic analogues do not dominate either species-wise or in a numerical sense;
single-celled and individual animals are still the norm. This suggests that even if
borganisms are attractors and self-supporting, they may not be so advantageous or flexible
that they out-compete all other lifestyles (especially since in an environment with
borganisms there exists a memetic evolutionary advantage to exploit them for
non-borganisms).

What are the biggest advantages of borganisms? They provide an "easy" way to
create superhuman entities (it might even be argued that we have created simple
low-bandwidth borganisms based on metasystems today: organisations and states), and there
does not appear to exist any obvious barrier to their creation (although plenty of
experimentation in group-interaction and -integration is clearly needed). Borganisms would
be able to solve some large classes of problems and implement the solutions much more
efficiently than collections of individuals, giving them a practical and economical
advantage. There is also the long-standing human dream of total community which may make
borganisms desirable to some for purely aesthetic or emotional reasons.

Regardless of one's view of borganisms it is clear that they provide a possible
posthuman state, and that they are advantageous in some situations. This is usually enough
to ensure that at least some borganisms will eventually be implemented by some group for
some reason. Resistance is futile.

Bibliography
------------

Baron, R.A., Byrne D. (1991) *Social Psychology: Understanding Human Interaction*
 (6th ed.) Boston: Allyn & Bacon

Bjarneskans, H., Grřnnevik, B. & Sandberg, A., 1997, The Lifecycle of Memes *Homo
 Excelsior*, [http://www.aleph.se/Trans/Cultural/Memetics/memecycle.html](file:///h:/alephweb/Trans/Cultural/Memetics/memecycle.html)

Boström, N., 1997, Predictions from Philosophy?, <http://www.hedweb.com/nickb/predict.htm>

Chialvo, D.R, Millonas, M.M., 1995, *How Swarms Build Cognitive Maps* Santa Fe
 Institute working paper 95-03-033, [Abstract](http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Abstracts/95-03-033abs.html), [PostScript
 version](http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/95-03-033.ps)

Dawkins R, (1976) The Selfish Gene , Oxford: Oxford University Press

Hellriegel, D., Slocum, J.W. Jr., Woodman, R.W. (1989) *Organizational Behavior*
 (5th ed.) St Paul: West.

Hilgard, E.R. (1977) *Divided Consciousness: Multiple Controls in Human Thought and
 Action*, New York: Wiley

Hobbes, T., 1651, *Leviathan*

Kelly, K.,*Out of Control: the New Biology of Machines*, London Fourth Estate
 1994, ISBN 1-85702-308-0

Mark S. Miller and K. Eric Drexler, Incentive Engineering: for Computational Resource
 Management in *The Ecology of Computation*, Bernardo Huberman (ed.) Elsevier Science
 Publishers/North-Holland, 1988. <http://www.webcom.com/~agorics/agorpapers.html>

Minsky, M., 1988, *The Society of Mind*, Simon & Schuster

Moravec, H.,*Mind Children: the Future of Robot and Human Intelligence*, Cambridge
 Harvard University Press, 1988 ISBN 0- 674-57618-7

Morrow, T. 1996, >H HUMOR: Borganism in the media, [http://www.aleph.se/Trans/Cultural/Fun/0173.html](file:///h:/alephweb/Trans/Cultural/Fun/0173.html)

Nicholls, P., 1982 *The Science in Science Fiction*, Roxby Science Fiction Limited

Putnam, F.W. (1989) *Diagnosis and treatment of multiple personality disorder* New
 York: Guilford

Stapledon, O., 1931, *Last and First Men*

Stapledon, O., 1937, *Star Maker*

Turchin, V., Joslyn, C., 1993, The Metasystem Transition <http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/MST.html>

Weiser, M., The Computer for the 21st Century, *Scientific American*, pp. 94-10,
 September 1991, <http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/SciAmDraft3.html>

Weiser, M. 1996, Nomadic Issues in Ubiquitous Computing, talk given at Nomadic '96
 conference. [Slides](http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/NomadicInteractive/).

We, Borg: Speculations on hive minds as a posthuman state


Abstract
--------

This article is based on a series of special lectures delivered at University College, London, in November 1972.

[Access through your institution](https://wayf.springernature.com?redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nature.com%2Farticles%2F241507a0)

[Buy or subscribe](#access-options)

This is a preview of subscription content, [access via your institution](https://wayf.springernature.com?redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nature.com%2Farticles%2F241507a0)

 if (window.dataLayer) {
 window.dataLayer.push({
 content: { article: { relevantArticlesCount: 0 }}
 })
 }

Access options
--------------

[Access through your institution](https://wayf.springernature.com?redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nature.com%2Farticles%2F241507a0)

[Access through your institution](https://wayf.springernature.com?redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nature.com%2Farticles%2F241507a0)

[Change institution](https://wayf.springernature.com?redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nature.com%2Farticles%2F241507a0)

[Buy or subscribe](#access-options)

/\* style specs start \*/
style{display:none!important}.LiveAreaSection-193358632 \*{align-content:stretch;align-items:stretch;align-self:auto;animation-delay:0s;animation-direction:normal;animation-duration:0s;animation-fill-mode:none;animation-iteration-count:1;animation-name:none;animation-play-state:running;animation-timing-function:ease;azimuth:center;backface-visibility:visible;background-attachment:scroll;background-blend-mode:normal;background-clip:borderBox;background-color:transparent;background-image:none;background-origin:paddingBox;background-position:0 0;background-repeat:repeat;background-size:auto auto;block-size:auto;border-block-end-color:currentcolor;border-block-end-style:none;border-block-end-width:medium;border-block-start-color:currentcolor;border-block-start-style:none;border-block-start-width:medium;border-bottom-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-left-radius:0;border-bottom-right-radius:0;border-bottom-style:none;border-bottom-width:medium;border-collapse:separate;border-image-outset:0s;border-image-repeat:stretch;border-image-slice:100%;border-image-source:none;border-image-width:1;border-inline-end-color:currentcolor;border-inline-end-style:none;border-inline-end-width:medium;border-inline-start-color:currentcolor;border-inline-start-style:none;border-inline-start-width:medium;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-left-style:none;border-left-width:medium;border-right-color:currentcolor;border-right-style:none;border-right-width:medium;border-spacing:0;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-top-left-radius:0;border-top-right-radius:0;border-top-style:none;border-top-width:medium;bottom:auto;box-decoration-break:slice;box-shadow:none;box-sizing:border-box;break-after:auto;break-before:auto;break-inside:auto;caption-side:top;caret-color:auto;clear:none;clip:auto;clip-path:none;color:initial;column-count:auto;column-fill:balance;column-gap:normal;column-rule-color:currentcolor;column-rule-style:none;column-rule-width:medium;column-span:none;column-width:auto;content:normal;counter-increment:none;counter-reset:none;cursor:auto;display:inline;empty-cells:show;filter:none;flex-basis:auto;flex-direction:row;flex-grow:0;flex-shrink:1;flex-wrap:nowrap;float:none;font-family:initial;font-feature-settings:normal;font-kerning:auto;font-language-override:normal;font-size:medium;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;font-style:normal;font-synthesis:weight style;font-variant:normal;font-variant-alternates:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-position:normal;font-weight:400;grid-auto-columns:auto;grid-auto-flow:row;grid-auto-rows:auto;grid-column-end:auto;grid-column-gap:0;grid-column-start:auto;grid-row-end:auto;grid-row-gap:0;grid-row-start:auto;grid-template-areas:none;grid-template-columns:none;grid-template-rows:none;height:auto;hyphens:manual;image-orientation:0deg;image-rendering:auto;image-resolution:1dppx;ime-mode:auto;inline-size:auto;isolation:auto;justify-content:flexStart;left:auto;letter-spacing:normal;line-break:auto;line-height:normal;list-style-image:none;list-style-position:outside;list-style-type:disc;margin-block-end:0;margin-block-start:0;margin-bottom:0;margin-inline-end:0;margin-inline-start:0;margin-left:0;margin-right:0;margin-top:0;mask-clip:borderBox;mask-composite:add;mask-image:none;mask-mode:matchSource;mask-origin:borderBox;mask-position:0 0;mask-repeat:repeat;mask-size:auto;mask-type:luminance;max-height:none;max-width:none;min-block-size:0;min-height:0;min-inline-size:0;min-width:0;mix-blend-mode:normal;object-fit:fill;object-position:50% 50%;offset-block-end:auto;offset-block-start:auto;offset-inline-end:auto;offset-inline-start:auto;opacity:1;order:0;orphans:2;outline-color:initial;outline-offset:0;outline-style:none;outline-width:medium;overflow:visible;overflow-wrap:normal;overflow-x:visible;overflow-y:visible;padding-block-end:0;padding-block-start:0;padding-bottom:0;padding-inline-end:0;padding-inline-start:0;padding-left:0;padding-right:0;padding-top:0;page-break-after:auto;page-break-before:auto;page-break-inside:auto;perspective:none;perspective-origin:50% 50%;pointer-events:auto;position:static;quotes:initial;resize:none;right:auto;ruby-align:spaceAround;ruby-merge:separate;ruby-position:over;scroll-behavior:auto;scroll-snap-coordinate:none;scroll-snap-destination:0 0;scroll-snap-points-x:none;scroll-snap-points-y:none;scroll-snap-type:none;shape-image-threshold:0;shape-margin:0;shape-outside:none;tab-size:8;table-layout:auto;text-align:initial;text-align-last:auto;text-combine-upright:none;text-decoration-color:currentcolor;text-decoration-line:none;text-decoration-style:solid;text-emphasis-color:currentcolor;text-emphasis-position:over right;text-emphasis-style:none;text-indent:0;text-justify:auto;text-orientation:mixed;text-overflow:clip;text-rendering:auto;text-shadow:none;text-transform:none;text-underline-position:auto;top:auto;touch-action:auto;transform:none;transform-box:borderBox;transform-origin:50% 50%0;transform-style:flat;transition-delay:0s;transition-duration:0s;transition-property:all;transition-timing-function:ease;vertical-align:baseline;visibility:visible;white-space:normal;widows:2;width:auto;will-change:auto;word-break:normal;word-spacing:normal;word-wrap:normal;writing-mode:horizontalTb;z-index:auto;-webkit-appearance:none;-moz-appearance:none;-ms-appearance:none;appearance:none;margin:0}.LiveAreaSection-193358632{width:100%}.LiveAreaSection-193358632 .login-option-buybox{display:block;width:100%;font-size:17px;line-height:30px;color:#222;padding-top:30px;font-family:Harding,Palatino,serif}.LiveAreaSection-193358632 .additional-access-options{display:block;font-weight:700;font-size:17px;line-height:30px;color:#222;font-family:Harding,Palatino,serif}.LiveAreaSection-193358632 .additional-login>li:not(:first-child)::before{transform:translateY(-50%);content:"";height:1rem;position:absolute;top:50%;left:0;border-left:2px solid #999}.LiveAreaSection-193358632 .additional-login>li:not(:first-child){padding-left:10px}.LiveAreaSection-193358632 .additional-login>li{display:inline-block;position:relative;vertical-align:middle;padding-right:10px}.BuyBoxSection-683559780{display:flex;flex-wrap:wrap;flex:1;flex-direction:row-reverse;margin:-30px -15px 0}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .box-inner{width:100%;height:100%}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .readcube-buybox{background-color:#f3f3f3;flex-shrink:1;flex-grow:1;flex-basis:255px;background-clip:content-box;padding:0 15px;margin-top:30px}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .subscribe-buybox{background-color:#f3f3f3;flex-shrink:1;flex-grow:4;flex-basis:300px;background-clip:content-box;padding:0 15px;margin-top:30px}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .subscribe-buybox-nature-plus{background-color:#f3f3f3;flex-shrink:1;flex-grow:4;flex-basis:100%;background-clip:content-box;padding:0 15px;margin-top:30px}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .title-readcube,.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .title-buybox{display:block;margin:0;margin-right:10%;margin-left:10%;font-size:24px;line-height:32px;color:#222;padding-top:30px;text-align:center;font-family:Harding,Palatino,serif}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .title-asia-buybox{display:block;margin:0;margin-right:5%;margin-left:5%;font-size:24px;line-height:32px;color:#222;padding-top:30px;text-align:center;font-family:Harding,Palatino,serif}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .asia-link{color:#069;cursor:pointer;text-decoration:none;font-size:1.05em;font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif;line-height:1.05em6}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .access-readcube{display:block;margin:0;margin-right:10%;margin-left:10%;font-size:14px;color:#222;padding-top:10px;text-align:center;font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif;line-height:20px}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .access-asia-buybox{display:block;margin:0;margin-right:5%;margin-left:5%;font-size:14px;color:#222;padding-top:10px;text-align:center;font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif;line-height:20px}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .access-buybox{display:block;margin:0;margin-right:10%;margin-left:10%;font-size:14px;color:#222;opacity:.8px;padding-top:10px;text-align:center;font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif;line-height:20px}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .price-buybox{display:block;font-size:30px;color:#222;font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif;padding-top:30px;text-align:center}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .price-buybox-to{display:block;font-size:30px;color:#222;font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif;text-align:center}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .price-info-text{font-size:16px;padding-right:10px;color:#222;font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .price-value{font-size:30px;font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .price-per-period{font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .price-from{font-size:14px;padding-right:10px;color:#222;font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif;line-height:20px}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .issue-buybox{display:block;font-size:13px;text-align:center;color:#222;font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif;line-height:19px}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .no-price-buybox{display:block;font-size:13px;line-height:18px;text-align:center;padding-right:10%;padding-left:10%;padding-bottom:20px;padding-top:30px;color:#222;font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .vat-buybox{display:block;margin-top:5px;margin-right:20%;margin-left:20%;font-size:11px;color:#222;padding-top:10px;padding-bottom:15px;text-align:center;font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif;line-height:17px}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .tax-buybox{display:block;width:100%;color:#222;padding:20px 16px;text-align:center;font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif;line-height:NaNpx}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .button-container{display:flex;padding-right:20px;padding-left:20px;justify-content:center}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .button-container>\*{flex:1px}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .button-container>a:hover,.Button-1078489254:hover,.Button-2496381730:hover{text-decoration:none}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .readcube-button{background:#fff;margin-top:30px}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .button-asia{background:#069;border:1px solid #069;border-radius:0;cursor:pointer;display:block;padding:9px;outline:0;text-align:center;text-decoration:none;min-width:80px;margin-top:75px}.BuyBoxSection-683559780 .button-label-asia,.ButtonLabel-3296148077,.ButtonLabel-1651148777{display:block;color:#fff;font-size:17px;line-height:20px;font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif;text-align:center;text-decoration:none;cursor:pointer}.Button-1078489254,.Button-2496381730{background:#069;border:1px solid #069;border-radius:0;cursor:pointer;display:block;padding:9px;outline:0;text-align:center;text-decoration:none;min-width:80px;max-width:320px;margin-top:10px}.Button-1078489254 .readcube-label,.Button-2496381730 .readcube-label{color:#069}
/\* style specs end \*/Subscribe to this journal

Receive 51 print issues and online access

199,00 € per year

only 3,90 € per issue

[Learn more](/nature/subscribe)Rent or buy this article

Prices vary by article type

from$1.95

to$39.95

[Learn more](//www.nature.com/articles/241507a0.epdf?no_publisher_access=1&r3_referer=nature)Prices may be subject to local taxes which are calculated during checkout

### Additional access options:

* [Log in](https://idp.nature.com/authorize/natureuser?client_id=grover&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nature.com%2Farticles%2F241507a0)
* [Learn about institutional subscriptions](https://www.springernature.com/gp/librarians/licensing/license-options)
* [Read our FAQs](https://support.nature.com/en/support/home)
* [Contact customer support](https://www.springernature.com/gp/contact)

References
----------

1. Lighthill, M. J., *Artificial Intelligence: a general survey* (to be published by the Science Research Council, London).
2. Turing, A. M., in *Machine Intelligence 5* (edit. by Meltzer, B., and Michie, D.), 3 (Edinburgh University Press, 1969).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Machine%20Intelligence%205&publication_year=1969&author=Turing%2CAM)
3. Maynard Smith, J., *Evolution*, **6**, 127 (1952), reprinted in *On Evolution* (edit. by Maynard Smith, J.), 29 (Edinburgh University Press, 1972).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Evolution&publication_year=1952&author=Maynard%20Smith%2CJ)
4. Shannon, C. E., *Phil. Mag.*, **41**, 356 (1950).

[Article](https://doi.org/10.1080%2F14786445008521796)
 [Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=&journal=Phil.%20Mag.&doi=10.1080%2F14786445008521796&volume=41&publication_year=1950&author=Shannon%2CCE)
5. Turing, A. M., in *Faster than Thought* (edit. by Bowden, B. V.), 288 (Pitman, London, 1953).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Faster%20than%20Thought&publication_year=1953&author=Turing%2CAM)
6. Newell, A., Shaw, J. C., and Simon, H. A., *IBM J. Res. Dev.*, **2**, 320 (1958).

[Article](https://doi.org/10.1147%2Frd.24.0320)
 [Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=&journal=IBM%20J.%20Res.%20Dev.&doi=10.1147%2Frd.24.0320&volume=2&publication_year=1958&author=Newell%2CA&author=Shaw%2CJC&author=Simon%2CHA)
7. Samuel, A. L., *IBM J. Res. Dev.*, **3**, 210 (1959).

[Article](https://doi.org/10.1147%2Frd.33.0210)
 [Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=&journal=IBM%20J.%20Res.%20Dev.&doi=10.1147%2Frd.33.0210&volume=3&publication_year=1959&author=Samuel%2CAL)
8. Michie, D., Ross, R., and Shannan, G. J., in *Machine Intelligence 7* (edit. by Meltzer, B., and Michie, D.), 141 (Edinburgh University Press, 1972).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Machine%20Intelligence%207&publication_year=1972&author=Michie%2CD&author=Ross%2CR&author=Shannan%2CGJ)
9. Doran, J. E., and Michie, D., *Proc. Roy. Soc.*, A, **294**, 235 (1966).

[ADS](http://adsabs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/nph-data_query?link_type=ABSTRACT&bibcode=1966RSPSA.294..235D)
 [Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=&journal=Proc.%20Roy.%20Soc.&volume=294&publication_year=1966&author=Doran%2CJE&author=Michie%2CD)
10. Hart, P., Nilsson, N. J., and Raphael, B., *IEEE Trans. on Sys. Sci. and Cybernetics*, SSC-4, 100 (1968).
11. Michie, D., and Ross, R., in *Machine Intelligence 5* (edit. by Meltzer, B., and Michie, D.), 301 (Edinburgh University Press, 1969).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Machine%20Intelligence%205&publication_year=1969&author=Michie%2CD&author=Ross%2CR)
12. Pohl, I., *Artificial Intelligence*, **1**, 193 (1970).

[Article](https://doi.org/10.1016%2F0004-3702%2870%2990007-X)
 [MathSciNet](http://www.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=294179)
 [Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=&journal=Artificial%20Intelligence&doi=10.1016%2F0004-3702%2870%2990007-X&volume=1&publication_year=1970&author=Pohl%2CI)
13. Michie, D., in *Artificial Intelligence and Heuristic Programming* (edit. by Findler, N. V., and Meltzer, B.), 101 (Edinburgh University Press, 1971).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Artificial%20Intelligence%20and%20Heuristic%20Programming&publication_year=1971&author=Michie%2CD)
14. Fikes, R. E., Hart, P. E., and Nilsson, N. J., *Artificial Intelligence*, **3**, 251 (1972).

[Article](https://doi.org/10.1016%2F0004-3702%2872%2990051-3)
 [Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=&journal=Artificial%20Intelligence&doi=10.1016%2F0004-3702%2872%2990051-3&volume=3&publication_year=1972&author=Fikes%2CRE&author=Hart%2CPE&author=Nilsson%2CNJ)
15. Fikes, R. E., and Nilsson, N. J., *Artificial Intelligence*, **2**, 189 (1971).

[Article](https://doi.org/10.1016%2F0004-3702%2871%2990010-5)
 [Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=&journal=Artificial%20Intelligence&doi=10.1016%2F0004-3702%2871%2990010-5&volume=2&publication_year=1971&author=Fikes%2CRE&author=Nilsson%2CNJ)
16. Winston, P. H., thesis, MIT (1970), reprinted as *MAC-TR-76* (MIT, Project MAC, 1970).
17. Bobrow, D. G., thesis, MIT (1964), reprinted in *Semantic Information Processing* (edit. by Minsky, M.) (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1968).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Semantic%20Information%20Processing&publication_year=1964&author=Bobrow%2CDG)
18. Woods, W. A., Kaplan, R. M., and Nash-Webber, B., *BBN Report No. 2378* (Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Cambridge, Mass. 1972).
19. Winograd, T., thesis, MIT (1970), reprinted in revised form as *MAC-TR-84* (MIT, Project MAC, 1971); also available as *Understanding Natural Language* (Edinburgh University Press, 1972).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Understanding%20Natural%20Language&publication_year=1970&author=Winograd%2CT)
20. Feibenbaum, E. A., Buchanan, B. G., and Lederberg, J., in *Machine Intelligence 6* (edit. by Meltzer, B., and Michie, D.), 165 (Edinburgh University Press, 1971).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Machine%20Intelligence%206&publication_year=1971&author=Feibenbaum%2CEA&author=Buchanan%2CBG&author=Lederberg%2CJ)
21. McCarthy, J., and Hayes, P. J., in *Machine Intelligence 4* (edit. by Meltzer, B., and Michie, D.), 463 (Edinburgh University Press, 1969).

[MATH](http://www.emis.de/MATH-item?0226.68044)
 [Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Machine%20Intelligence%204&publication_year=1969&author=McCarthy%2CJ&author=Hayes%2CPJ)
22. Ryle, G., *The Concept of Mind* (Hutchinson, London, 1949).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=The%20Concept%20of%20Mind&publication_year=1949&author=Ryle%2CG)
23. Green, C. C., *Proc. Intern. Joint. Conf. Art. Intell*. (edit. by Walker, D. E., and Norton, L. M.), 219 (Washington DC, 1969).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Proc.%20Intern.%20Joint.%20Conf.%20Art.%20Intell&publication_year=1969&author=Green%2CCC)
24. Raphael, B., in *Artificial Intelligence and Heuristic Programming* (edit. by Findler, N. V., and Meltzer, B.), 159 (Edinburgh University Press, 1971).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Artificial%20Intelligence%20and%20Heuristic%20Programming&publication_year=1971&author=Raphael%2CB)
25. Hayes, P. J., in *Machine Intelligence 6* (edit. by Meltzer, B., and Michie, D.), 495 (Edinburgh University Press, 1971).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Machine%20Intelligence%206&publication_year=1971&author=Hayes%2CPJ)
26. Burstall, R. M., Collins, J. S., and Popplestone, R. J., *Programming in POP-2* (Edinburgh University Press, 1971).

[MATH](http://www.emis.de/MATH-item?0216.49903)
 [Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Programming%20in%20POP-2&publication_year=1971&author=Burstall%2CRM&author=Collins%2CJS&author=Popplestone%2CRJ)
27. Michie, D., *Nature*, **228**, 717 (1970).

[Article](https://doi.org/10.1038%2F228717a0)
 [ADS](http://adsabs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/nph-data_query?link_type=ABSTRACT&bibcode=1970Natur.228..717M)
 [CAS](/articles/cas-redirect/1:STN:280:DyaE3M%2Fht1Gqtw%3D%3D)
 [Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=&journal=Nature&doi=10.1038%2F228717a0&volume=228&publication_year=1970&author=Michie%2CD)
28. Hewitt, C., thesis, MIT (1971), reprinted as *Art. Intell. Mem. 258* (MIT, Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, 1972).
29. Rulifson, J. F., Waldinger, R. J., and Derksen, J. A., *Technical Note 48* (Stanford Research Institute, Artificial Intelligence Group, 1970).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Technical%20Note%2048&publication_year=1970&author=Rulifson%2CJF&author=Waldinger%2CRJ&author=Derksen%2CJA)
30. McDermott, D. V., and Sussman, G. J., *Art. Intell. Mem. 259* (MIT, Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, 1972).
31. Fikes, R. E., Hart, P. E., and Nilsson, N. J., in *Machine Intelligence* (edit. by Meltzer, B., and Michie, D.), 405 (Edinburgh University Press, 1972).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Machine%20Intelligence&publication_year=1972&author=Fikes%2CRE&author=Hart%2CPE&author=Nilsson%2CNJ)
32. Shirai, Y., and Suwa, M., *Proc. Second Intern. Joint Conf. Art. Intell.*, 80 (British Computer Society, London, 1971).
33. Will, P. M., and Pennington, K. S., *Artificial Intelligence*, **2**, 319 (1971).

[Article](https://doi.org/10.1016%2F0004-3702%2871%2990015-4)
 [Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=&journal=Artificial%20Intelligence&doi=10.1016%2F0004-3702%2871%2990015-4&volume=2&publication_year=1971&author=Will%2CPM&author=Pennington%2CKS)
34. Ejiri, M., Unon, T., Yoda, H., Goto, T., and Takeyasu, K., in *Proc. Second Intern. Joint Conf. on Art. Intell.*, 350 (British Computer Society, London, 1971).
35. Tan, S. T., *Research Memorandum* MIP-R-98 (University of Edinburgh, School of Artificial Intelligence, 1972).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Research%20Memorandum&publication_year=1972&author=Tan%2CST)
36. Huffman, D. A. in *Machine Intelligence 6* (edit. by Meltzer, B., and Michie, D.), 295 (Edinburgh University Press, 1971).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Machine%20Intelligence%206&publication_year=1971&author=Huffman%2CDA)
37. McCarthy, J., *Memo No. 16* (Stanford University, Stanford Artificial Intelligence Project, 1964).
38. Craik, K. J. W., *The Nature of Explanation* (Cambridge University Press, 1952).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=The%20Nature%20of%20Explanation&publication_year=1952&author=Craik%2CKJW)
39. Choate, R., and Jaffe, L. D., in *Proc. First National Conference on Remotely Manned Systems (RMS)* (forthcoming).
40. Plotkin, G., in *Machine Intelligence 5* (edit. by Meltzer, B., and Michie, D.), 153 (Edinburgh University Press, 1969); also in *Machine Intelligence 6* (edit. by Meltzer, B., and Michie, D.), 101 (Edinburgh University Press, 1971).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Machine%20Intelligence%205&publication_year=1969&author=Plotkin%2CG)
41. Papert, S., *Art. Intell. Mem. 247* (MIT, Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, 1971).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Art.%20Intell.%20Mem.%20247&publication_year=1971&author=Papert%2CS)
42. Winston, P. H., in *Machine Intelligence 7* (edit. by Meltzer, B., and Michie, D.), 431 (Edinburgh University Press, 1972).

[Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?&title=Machine%20Intelligence%207&publication_year=1972&author=Winston%2CPH)

[Download references](https://citation-needed.springer.com/v2/references/10.1038/241507a0?format=refman&flavour=references)

Author information
------------------

### Authors and Affiliations

1. Department of Machine Intelligence, University of Edinburgh,

DONALD MICHIE

Authors1. DONALD MICHIE[View author publications](/search?author=DONALD%20MICHIE)You can also search for this author in
 [PubMed](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=search&term=DONALD%20MICHIE) [Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?as_q=&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=%22DONALD%20MICHIE%22&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_allsubj=all&hl=en)
Rights and permissions
----------------------

[Reprints and Permissions](https://s100.copyright.com/AppDispatchServlet?title=Machines%20and%20the%20Theory%20of%20Intelligence&author=DONALD%20MICHIE&contentID=10.1038%2F241507a0&copyright=Springer%20Nature%20Limited&publication=0028-0836&publicationDate=1973-02-23&publisherName=SpringerNature&orderBeanReset=true)

Comments
--------

By submitting a comment you agree to abide by our [Terms](/info/tandc.html) and [Community Guidelines](/info/community-guidelines.html). If you find something abusive or that does not comply with our terms or guidelines please flag it as inappropriate.

Machines and the Theory of Intelligence


[Download PDF](/articles/548520a.pdf)

### Subjects

* [Government](/subjects/government)
* [Mathematics and computing](/subjects/mathematics-and-computing)
* [Society](/subjects/society)
* [Technology](/subjects/technology)

Stuart Russell weighs up a book on the risks and rewards of the AI revolution.

Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence
-----------------------------------------------------------

* *Max Tegmark*

Knopf: 2017. 9781101946596, 9780241237199 | ISBN: 978-1-1019-4659-6
Max Tegmark is a renowned physicist. He is also the irrepressibly optimistic co-founder of the Future of Life Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts (motto: “Technology is giving life the potential to flourish like never before ... or to self-destruct. Let's make a difference!”). Now, in *Life 3.0*, he tackles a pressing future development — the evolution of artificial intelligence (AI). He argues that the risks demand serious thought if our “cosmic endowment” is not to be inadvertently thrown away.

![](//media.springernature.com/w300/springer-static/image/art%3A10.1038%2F548520a/MediaObjects/41586_2017_Article_BF548520a_Figa_HTML.jpg)'RoboBees' are meant for artificial pollination but could have unforeseen environmental effects.
 Credit: Thierry Falise/Lightrocket Via GettyIn the interests of disclosure, Tegmark and I are collaborators and share a literary agent. With physicists Stephen Hawking and Frank Wilczek, we wrote the 2014 *Huffington Post* article 'Transcending complacency on superintelligent machines' (see [go.nature.com/2wadkao](http://go.nature.com/2wadkao)). Ostensibly a review of Wally Pfister's dystopian AI film *Transcendence*, this was really a call to the AI community to take the risks of intelligent systems seriously. Thus, I am unlikely to disagree strongly with the premise of *Life 3.0*. Life, Tegmark argues, may or may not spread through the Universe and “flourish for billions or trillions of years” because of decisions we make now — a possibility both seductive and overwhelming.

The book's title refers to a third phase in evolutionary history. For almost 4 billion years, both hardware (bodies) and software (capacity for generating behaviour) were fixed by biology. For the next 100,000 years, learning and culture enabled humans to adapt and control their own software. In the imminent third phase, both software and hardware can be redesigned. This may sound like transhumanism — the movement to re-engineer body and brain — but Tegmark's focus is on AI, which supplements mental capabilities with external devices.

Tegmark considers both risks and benefits. Near-term risks include an arms race in autonomous weapons and dramatic reductions in employment. The AI community is practically unanimous in condemning the creation of machines that can choose to kill humans, but the issue of work has sparked debate. Many predict an economic boon — AI inspiring new jobs to replace old, as with previous industrial revolutions. Tegmark wryly imagines two horses discussing the rise of the internal combustion engine in 1900. One predicts “new jobs for horses ... That's what's always happened before, like with the invention of the wheel and the plow.” For most horses, alas, the “new job” was to be pet food. Tegmark's analysis is compelling, and shared by economists such as Paul Krugman. But the question remains: what desirable economy might we aim for, when most of what we now call work is done by machines?

The longer-term risks are existential. The book's fictional prelude describes a reasonably plausible scenario in which superintelligent AI might emerge. Later, Tegmark ranges over global outcomes from near-Utopias to human enslavement or extinction. That we have no idea how to steer towards the better futures points to a dearth of serious thinking on why making AI better might be a bad thing.

Computer pioneer Alan Turing, raising the possibility in 1951 that our species would at best be “greatly humbled” by AI, expressed the general unease of making something smarter than oneself. Assuaging this unease by curtailing progress on AI may be neither feasible nor preferable. The most interesting part of *Life 3.0* explains that the real issue is the potential for misaligned objectives. Cybernetics founder Norbert Wiener wrote in 1960, “We had better be quite sure that the purpose put into the machine is the purpose which we really desire.” Or, as Tegmark has it, “It's unclear how to imbue a superintelligent AI with an ultimate goal that neither is undefined nor leads to the elimination of humanity.” In my view, this technological and philosophical problem demands all the intellectual resources we can bring to bear.

Only if we solve it can we reap the benefits. Among these is expansion across the Universe, perhaps powered by such exotic technologies as Dyson spheres (which would capture the energy of a star), accelerators built around black holes or Tegmark's theorized sphalerizers (like diesel engines, but quark-powered and one billion times more efficient). For sheer science fun, it's hard to beat the explanations of how much upside the Universe and the laws of physics will allow. We may one day, for example, expand the biosphere “by about 32 orders of magnitude”. It's seriously disappointing, then, to learn that cosmic expansion may limit us to settling only 10 billion galaxies. And we feel our descendants' anxiety as “the threat of dark energy tearing cosmic civilizations apart motivates massive cosmic engineering projects”.

The book concludes with the Future of Life Institute's role in moving these issues into mainstream AI thinking — for which Tegmark deserves huge credit. He is not alone, of course, in raising the alarm. In its sweeping vision, *Life 3.0* has most in common with Nick Bostrom's 2014 *Superintelligence* (Oxford University Press). Unlike Bostrom, however, Tegmark is not trying to prove that risk is unavoidable; and he eschews dense philosophy in favour of asking the reader which scenarios they think more probable or desirable.

Although I strongly recommend both books, I suspect that Tegmark's is less likely to provoke in AI researchers a common allergic reaction — a retreat into defensive arguments for paying no attention. Here's a typical one: we don't worry about remote but species-ending possibilities such as black holes materializing in near-Earth orbit, so why worry about superintelligent AI? Answer: if physicists were working to make such black holes, wouldn't we ask them if it was safe?

*The Economist* has drily characterized the overarching issue thus: “The implications of introducing a second intelligent species onto Earth are far-reaching enough to deserve hard thinking.” *Life 3.0* is far from the last word on AI and the future, but it provides a fascinating glimpse of the hard thinking required.

Author information
------------------

Author notes1. co-author of *Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach*.

### Authors and Affiliations

1. professor of computer science at the University of California, Berkeley

Stuart Russell

Authors1. Stuart Russell[View author publications](/search?author=Stuart%20Russell)You can also search for this author in
 [PubMed](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=search&term=Stuart%20Russell) [Google Scholar](http://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?as_q=&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=%22Stuart%20Russell%22&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_allsubj=all&hl=en)
### Corresponding author

Correspondence to
 [Stuart Russell](mailto:russell@berkeley.edu).

Related links
-------------

### Related links

### Related links in Nature Research

[Artificial Intelligence: Chess match of the century](https://doi.org/10.1038/544413a)

[Robotics: Countering singularity sensationalism](https://doi.org/10.1038/526320a)

[Robotics: Morals and machines](https://doi.org/10.1038/481026a)

### Web links

[*Nature* special: Turing at 100](http://www.nature.com/news/specials/turing/index.html)

[Books & Arts blog: Lust and the Turing test](http://blogs.nature.com/aviewfromthebridge/2015/05/27/lust-and-the-turing-test/)

### Related external links

[Future of Life Institute](https://futureoflife.org/)

Rights and permissions
----------------------

[Reprints and Permissions](https://s100.copyright.com/AppDispatchServlet?title=Artificial%20intelligence%3A%20The%20future%20is%20superintelligent&author=Stuart%20Russell&contentID=10.1038%2F548520a&copyright=Springer%20Nature%20Limited&publication=0028-0836&publicationDate=2017-08-31&publisherName=SpringerNature&orderBeanReset=true)

This article is cited by
------------------------

* ###
[Towards high-quality development: how does digital economy impact low-carbon inclusive development?: mechanism and path](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-023-25185-4)

	+ Guoge Yang
	+ Xianhong Xiang
	+ Fengyi Wang*Environmental Science and Pollution Research* (2023)
* ###
[Artificial intelligence CT screening model for thyroid-associated ophthalmopathy and tests under clinical conditions](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11548-020-02281-1)

	+ Xuefei Song
	+ Zijia Liu
	+ Huifang Zhou*International Journal of Computer Assisted Radiology and Surgery* (2021)
* ###
[A reference framework and overall planning of industrial artificial intelligence (I-AI) for new application scenarios](https://doi.org/10.1007/s00170-018-3106-3)

	+ Xianyu Zhang
	+ Xinguo Ming
	+ Yuan Chang*The International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology* (2019)

Artificial intelligence: The future is superintelligent [Book review of "Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence" by Max Tegmark]